Both have drawn theorists' attentions to either justify or criticise equilibrium theory, which requires the co-ordination of beliefs and actions among players. A drawback of rationalisability is its poor predictive power while that of evolution is lack of rationality in the decision making process. We show that the integration of these two ideas will be free of their respective drawbacks. We attempt to do this in a dynamic environment in which players are anonymous. A player's payoff depends only on his choice of action and the distribution of strategies in a society. A rationalisable foresight path is a path along which each player makes a rationalisable decision. We define social stability by making use of rationalisable foresight paths. A state is socially stable under rationalisable foresight if there exists no rationalizable foresight path that escapes from that state. We also define socially stable states under perfect foresight as the states from which no perfect foresight paths escape and show that social stability under rationalisable foresight sometimes makes sharper prediction than that under perfect foresight. Application to location theory is provided to show the usefulness of the stability captured by the concept of rationalizable foresight.]May, R. M., Bohoeffer, S. and Nowak, Martin A. (1995) 'Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation', in Mora/n, F., Moreno, A., Morelo, J. J. and Chaco/n, P. (eds.) Advances in Artificial Life: Proceedings of the Third European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL95) (Berlin: Sprnger-Verlag), pp. 749-759.
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