Rubinstein, Ariel (1986) 'Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma', Journal of Economic Theory, 39(1), June, pp. 83-96. [Players choose Moore machines rather than strategies.] [*0]

Sandholm, T. and Crites, R. (1996) 'Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma', Biosystems, 37(xx), xx, pp. 147-166. [*0]

* Schlag, Karl H. (1998) 'Why Imitate, And If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits', Journal of Economic Theory, 78(1), January, pp. 130-156. [Individuals in a finite population repeatedly choose among actions yielding uncertain payoffs. Between choices, each individual observes the action and realised outcome of one other individual. We restrict our search to learning rules with limited memory that increase expected payoffs regardless of the distribution underlying their realisations. It is shown that the rule that outperforms all others is that which imitates the action of an observed individual (whose realised outcome is better than self) with a probability proportional to the difference in these realisations. When each individual uses this best rule the aggregate population behaviour is approximated by the replicator dynamic.] [schlag_96.pdf] [*0]

Scodel, A. and Sayer, M. J. (1960) 'The Behavior of Prisoners in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" Game', Journal of Psychology, 50(xx), xx, pp. 133-158. [*0]

Schulz, U., Albers, W. and Mueller, U. (eds.) (1994) Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (Berlin: Springer-Verlag). [*0]

Schuster, P. and Sigmund, K. (1983) 'Replicator Dynamics', Journal of Theoretical Biology, xx(xx), xx, pp. 533-538. [*0]

Seguino, Stephanie, Stevens, Thomas and Lutz, Mark (1996) 'Gender and Cooperative Behaviour: Economic Man Rides Alone', Feminist Economics, 2(1), xx, pp. 1-21. [Is the degree of co-operation a gender phenomenon?] [*0]

Selten, Reinhard (ed.) (1991) Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics (New York, NY: Springer-Verlag). [C]

Seymour, R. (1993) 'Continuous Time Models of Evolutionary Games in Populations of Fixed Size', Mathematics Working Paper, University College London.

Shubik, Martin (1992) 'Three Simple Experimental Games', Working Paper 92-02-010, Economics Research Program, Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico.

+ Sinclair, P. J. N. (1990) 'The Economics of Imitation', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 37(2), May, pp. 113-144.

Skaperdas, Stergios (1992) 'Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights', American Economic Review, 82(4), September, pp. 720-739. [This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction and co-operation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other things being equal, an agent's power, a well-defined concept in this paper, is inversely related to an agent's resources when resources are valued according to marginal-productivity theory. Some implications for the evolution of property rights are drawn. The model is applicable to a variety of situations in which directly unproductive activities are prevalent.]

Skyrms, Brian (1994) 'Darwin Meets "The Logic of Decision": Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory', Philosophy of Science, 61, pp. 503-529.

Smale, Steve (1980) 'The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-cooperative Games', Econometrica, 48, pp. 1617-1634.

Stahl, Dale O. and Wilson, P. W. (1994) 'Experimental Evidence on Players Models of Other Players', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25(3), pp. 309-327.

Taylor, Michael (1976) Anarchy and Cooperation (London: John Wiley and Sons).

Taylor, Michael (1987) The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). [*1]

+ Van Damme, E. and Weibull, J.W. (1998) 'Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs', Draft Paper, Center for Economic Research Tilburg University, 29th September. [Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability: the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intended. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.] [D POSTSCRIPT] [D PDF]

* Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [*0]

Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1997) 'The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior', Econometrica, 65(2), xx, pp. 375-384. [JSTOR BUT NOT YET] [*0]

Von Neumann, J. and Morgensten, O. (1947) The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). [*0]

Weibull, Jo:rgen W. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: The M. I. T. Press). [*0]

+ Witt, Ulrich (1989a) 'The Evolution of Economic Institutions as a Propagation Process', Public Choice, 62(2), August, pp. 155-172. [An evolutionary game theoretic analysis of the spread of institutions as a diffusion process distinguishing between cases of spontaneous emergence and cases in which collective action is necessary to introduce the institution. Collective action is represented as organisation by 'change agents' who build a coalition taking the society above some threshold needed for spontaneous propagation.]